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Summary. The paper reports an attempt to estimate the determinants of entry in Greek
manufacturing industry in the 1984 ± 87 period and to identify the differences between locational
entry preferences. Entry in Athens is found to be hesitant with respect to factor s such as
pro® tability and increased competition. Conversely , entry in the rest of the country is strongly
related to expected pro ® ts and safe markets, negatively affected by relativ e labour costs and
indifferent to international competition threats. The `healthier’ approach of regiona l entry is
enhancing regional development prospects and partly justi ® es the strict regional policie s of the
1980s.
1. Introduction
Entry plays an important role in determining
the structure of industry and consequently its
conduct and performance. It also affects the
growth prospects of the sector and of the
speci® c markets, regional or national, where
it occurs. Thus, it may be considered as
highly important for regional development
and prosperity.1
The scope of this paper is to examine the
factors affecting entry in Greek manufactur-
ing industry, and to search for any differ-
ences between locational entry preferences.
Due to lack of available data, only differ-
ences between the main urban centre of
Greece, namely Athens, and the rest of the
country will be considered. Such differences,
if any, would be stimulating to detect since
they may provide an explanation for regional
imbalances and hints for future prospects.
The annual entry rate for the whole of
the country in the 1984±87 period is 20
per centÐ i.e. each year, 20 new ® rms
enter the manufacturing sector for every
100 existing ones. Of the 20 entries, 4 take
place in Athens (20 per cent of new entrants)
while the remaining 16 take place in the
rest of the country (80 per cent of new
entrants). The difference in the entry
numbers between Athens and the rest of
Greece implies that the determinants of entry
may be different and hence interesting to
examine.
In section 2 of the paper we explain the
model to be used; in section 3 we present the
empirical ® ndings; and in section 4 the con-
clusions.
2. Model and Data
There has been a lot of research on entry
models, the most popular remaining the
model by Orr (1974) with different exten-
sions (Duetsch, 1975, 1984; Khemani and
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Shapiro, 1986; McDonald, 1986; High® eld
and Smiley, 1987; Baldwin and Gorecki,
1987; Lieberman, 1987; Schwalbach, 1987;
Shapiro and Khemani, 1987; Storey and
Jones, 1987; Smiley, 1988; Acs & Au-
dretsch, 1989; Geroski, 1991a; Mayer and
Chappel, 1992).
The model assumes that entry, E, like any
investment decision depends on risk and re-
turn criteria. The return is determined by
pro ® t and growth expectations, while risk is
in¯ uenced by the barriers that incumbent
® rms can raise to deter entry (Caves and
Porter, 1977; Hilke, 1984; Smiley, 1988;
Geroski et al., 1990; Geroski, 1991b). The
barriers depend, in their turn, on behavioural,
structural, labour market, foreign trade and
other characteristics of the speci® c sector
where entry occurs. Thus, the entry equation
can be speci® ed as follows:
E 5 a 0 1 a 1 P * 1 a 2 G R 1 a 3 S I 1 a 4 K R
1 a 5 B R 1 a 6 C N 1 a 7 A D 1 a 8 W S
1 a 9 W A 1 a 10 S K 1 a 11 I M 1 a 12 E X 1 u
where P* is expected pro ® ts; GR is the
rate of growth; SI is the relative size of
the market; KR is capital requirements; BR
is business risk; CN is the degree of con-
centration; AD is advertising expenditures;
WS is the wage share in value added; WA
is the relative cost of labour; SK is skill
requirements; IM is the import penetration;
and EX is the ratio of exports to sales of
each sector. All other unknown factors are
included in u.
Entry data in Greece are rare and when
locational entry preferences are required,
they become even scantier. The National
Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) keeps a
record of all new establishments in the coun-
try, disaggregated by location into two cate-
gories: Athens and rest of Greece. The new
establishments included must invest in ma-
chinery of more than 15 HP which means
that the ® rms taken into account are of me-
dium and large size. Unfortunately, only
their number is known. No information on
invested assets or other size proxy is avail-
able. For the 1984±87 period, the data were
collected with no major changes in the sam-
ple criteria and the information was further
disaggregated in the 20 2-digit manufactur-
ing sectors annually. Thus 76 observations
were available.
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Entry was tried in different forms, such as
absolute numbers or their logs, but the one
adopted in the ® nal estimation is the ratio of
new establishments over the total number of
medium and large ® rms in each sector. The
Sargan’ s maximum likelihood test (Sargan,
1964) was used for the choice of the most
relevant speci® cation.
For expected pro ® ts, four different formu-
lations of expectations were tried: lagged, i.e.
P* 5 P 2 1; adaptive, i.e. P* 5 v o (1 2 v )j
P 2 j; rational with perfect foresight, i.e.
P 5 P 1 j, j $ 1; and static, i.e. P* 5 P. The
best results were given by lagged expecta-
tions and they are the ones reported in Table
1. P* is the log of gross pro ® ts lagged by
one year as published by the Statistical Ser-
vice of the Confederation of Greek Industries
(CGI).
GR is the annual growth rate of each
sector’ s employment. The growth rate of
sales and total assets were also tried. None
was signi ® cant and the last two seemed to
suffer from in¯ ation problems. Therefore
employment growth was ® nally used. SI
measures the relative size of the sector in
terms of value added with respect to value
added by industry as a whole. The larger the
size of the sector, the larger the replacement
effectÐ i.e. the more ® rms enter and leave
the sector. Both variables are published by
the NSSG.
KR is capital requirements which should
be a barrier to entry, since the higher the
capital required for an establishment the less
® rms would be willing to enter. There are no
data available on capital to ® t our sample.3
Therefore productivity was tried as a proxy
thinking that the higher the capital used the
higher productivity should be. Productivity
data are collected by the CGI.
BR is measured by the standard deviation
of pro ® tability in the last 4 years, divided by
the average pro ® tability in the same period.
CN is the share of the four largest ® rms of
each sector in terms of employment. AD is
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Table 1. Entry in Greek manufactu ring industry : Athens and the rest of Greece,
1984±87
Greece Athens Rest of Greece
C 2 0.86* 2 0.15* 2 0.71*
(2.89) (2.80) (2.71)
WS 1.27* 0.29* 0.98*
(4.24) (5.49) (3.71)
KR 0.03 2 0.39 0.42
(0.01) (0.75) (0.16)
SK 2 0.01 2 0.03*** 0.02
(0.11) (1.39) (0.16)
BR 0.20 2 0.02 0.21
(0.80) (0.37) (0.98)
P 0.86* 0.08*** 0.78*
(2.67) (1.45) (2.74)
GR 0.16 0.00 0.16
(0.53) (0.07) (0.62)
CN 0.92* 0.16* 0.76*
(6.31) (6.16) (5.92)
SI 2 0.27 0.06 2 0.32
(0.37) (0.43) (0.51)
WA 2 0.66* 2 0.06** 2 0.60*
(3.82) (1.90) (3.95)
AD 1.39 0.32 1.07
(0.56) (0.71) (0.50)
IM 0.27* 0.04* 0.23*
(3.01) (2.57) (2.90)
EX 2 0.27 2 0.78* 0.50
(0.13) (2.12) (0.28)
R Å 2 0.47 0.56 0.42
F 6.44 9.02 5.56
N 76 76 76
Notes: t-value s are reported in parentheses; coef ® cients with t-values
. 2.39 are signi ® cant at 1 per cent (*), t . 1.67 signi ® cant at 5 per cent (**)
and t . 1.30 signi ® cant at 10 per cent (***). One-tai l test.
the ratio of advertising expenditures over
sales. The source for CN and AD is the
NSSG.
The labour factor introduces three new
variables in the entry equation. WS is the
ratio of salaries and wages over value added.
WA is the ratio of the average wage of each
sector over the average wage of manufactur-
ing industry. Finally, SK is the ratio of
skilled personnel over total employment in
the sector. The source is again the NSSG.
IM is the percentage of relevant domestic
demand satis® ed by imports, while EX is the
percentage of sales which is exported. The
® rst series of data is provided by the Bank of
Greece and the second by the NSSG.
3. Empirical Findings
Table 1 reports the results of the entry
equation estimated separately for Greece,
Athens and the rest of the country. The
explanatory ability of the model is quite high
for such pooled sample of data and reaches
47 per cent, 56 per cent and 42 per cent of
the observed variation of the entry share
respectively.
The usual tests for heteroscedasticity and
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multicollinearity were performed. Neither
seemed to create serious problems. Corre-
lation between the explanatory variables
is not high. The Goldfeld and Quandt
test (Judge et al., 1988) was used to inspect
for heteroscedastic errors. The resulting F
ratios were 0.40 for Greece, 0.54 for Athens
and 0.37 for the rest of GreeceÐ all smaller
than the critical value of F with 23 DOF
at 5 per cent which is 2.01. Therefore, it
can be accepted that the residuals are
homoscedastic.
In 1985 an austerity programme was intro-
duced which strongly affected the business
environment. The cost of capital was in-
creased; a strict incomes policy was intro-
duced affecting the cost of labour; demand
and pro ® t expectations changed; imports
and exports were heavily affected either
by direct measures such as quotas or extra
duties or by the devaluation of currency.
In order to test for changes in the entry
decisions and the consequent instability
of the estimated coef® cients, a Chow test
was performed. The F values were 1.01
for Athens, 2.35 for the rest of the country
and 1.93 for Greece. They were smaller
than the critical values of F with 13 and
50 DOF at 5 per cent and 1 per cent which
were 1.95 and 2.50 respectively. Therefore
stability is assumed to have prevailed
throughout the period examined. Apparently
entry decisions followed the changes in the
independent variables but without structural
breakage. The austerity `shock’ was not
strong enough to cause discontinuit ies in the
entry decisions.
Most coef® cients are signi ® cant in the ag-
gregate equation. Expected pro ® ts are found
to affect the entry decision in a positive way,
as expected. Unexpected is the signi ® cantly
positive effect of concentration on entry
which remained positive in all three cases.
Concentration is though t to be a deterrent for
entry, since it makes collusion easier and
predatory behaviour more feasible (Schwal-
bach, 1991). The explanation may be that
entry occurs in highly concentrated sectors
because the large and possibly colluding
® rms set the (high) prices which new and
small ® rms adopt. Newcomers are, at least
initially, followers of the `price setters’ and
belong to the market fringe.
4
The positive sign of the wage share in
value added is not unreasonable, since it is
well known that new establishments occur in
labour-intensive sectorsÐ which remains a
structural problem for Greek industry. It is
the light and labour-intensive sectors, such as
food and beverages, textiles, apparel and
footwear, leather and fur, that attract more
entries and grow faster than capital-intensive
and high-tech ones; the result being the con-
tinuation of an unfavourable structure for
Greek industry in view of the integrated Eu-
ropean market of the late 1990s which calls
for a more balanced manufacturing pro-
duction. It should be stressed that the effect
is the same in Athens and the rest of the
country; which means that despite the appli-
cation of an industrial policy with a regional
dimension in the 1980s, no differences in the
sectoral entry preferences were observed.
The relative wage is found to affect entry
in a signi ® cantly negative way. It is not
unusual for entry to avoid sectors with rela-
tively high labour cost. However, it is the
light sectors that employ cheaper labour and
the negative sign stresses once again the
structural bias of entry towards the light side
of industry.
Import penetration is found to have a pos-
itively signi ® cant effect which is rather the
opposite of what was expected. Sectors with
high import penetration attract more entries,
maybe because imports are a sign of strong
demand and relatively high prices of the
sector’ s products. Imports may be considered
as a sign of a healthy market demand-wise
and may therefore be preferred for a less
risky entry. The sign remains positive for the
threes cases, but the Athens effect is much
smaller.
5
It is questionable why growth and size did
not have any signi ® cant impact anywhere.
One explanation may be that all the in¯ uence
of future prospects on entry is represented
only by pro ® t expectations. Skill require-
ments, export share and business risk did not
seem to affect the entry decision signi ® cantly
ENTRY IN GREEK MANUFACTURING 1131
either. Capital requirements were not
signi ® cant but the lack of good data may be
responsible for that. In any case, it is not
unreasonable since entrants seem to be at-
tracted by labour-in tensive and not capital-
intensive sectors. The former require much
less investment; hence the `sunk cost’ effect
on entry, represented by capital require-
ments, is negligibleÐ adding to the argument
that entry is biased towards light sectors with
low capital needs.
The main differences between entry in
Athens and the rest of Greece lie with
the expected pro ® ts and the export share
effects. Pro® t expectations do not seem
to affect much the entry decision in Athens
(small coef® cient and signi ® cant only
at 10 per cent) which means that ® rms
established in Athens may do so for other
reasons, such as proximity to the market
or other infrastructure facilities, availability
of labour or in general the existence of
urbanisation economies (Louri, 1988). It
should be stressed that the negative relative
wage effect in Athens is very small, probably
because availability of labour is easier and
cheaper there. Conversely, ® rms established
in the rest of Greece seem to take into
account very seriously both pro ® t expect-
ations and the relative cost of labour, as
should be expected.
The negative effect of export share
for Athens may mean that entrants are
negatively affected by the existence of
high exportsÐ probably because they
consider them as a sign of exceedingly
competitive markets. New ® rms may ® nd
it dif® cult to try to survive in such an
internationally competitive environment.
Entrant ® rms in the rest of Greece per-
ceive export share as non-signi ® cant either
because they are not interested in exports
or because they do not consider internation-
ally competitive sectors as a threat for their
success.
The general idea coming out of the results
presented in Table 1 is that, as far as regional
entry preferences are concerned, ® rms estab-
lished in Athens show a relative disrespect
for pro ® tability and a strong aversion to-
wards internationally competitive markets.
The relative wage effect is rather small and
skill requirements have a negative in¯ uence
on entry.
Entrants in the rest of the country consider
expected pro ® ts as highly signi ® cant and are
not in¯ uenced by international competition,
while they prefer secure sectors with high
concentration, high import penetration and
high labour share (Fritsch, 1992) . In a sense
it seems that entrants in the rest of the coun-
try have a more sound rationale for their
decision, while entrants in Athens are
dif® cult to interpret with the usual entry de-
terminants. Similar conclusions are reached
by other researchers (Kottis, 1980; Katochi-
anou, 1984) using much earlier data and
different methods of analysis.
It may be the case that urbanisation econ-
omies or even personal preferences play a
more signi ® cant role than the usual factors
given by entry theory (Norton, 1992) . It may
also be the case that regional entrants have a
healthier attitude towards investment deci-
sions which may be due to an encouraging
but strict regional-industrial policy applied in
the 1980s in Greece. If the `healthier’ ap-
proach is related to the four times higher rate
of entry in the rest of Greece as compared to
Athens, then regional industrial development
seems to have good prospects.
An additional point is based on the nega-
tive effect of the relative wage as combined
with the insigni ® cance of capital require-
ments. Such an association could give pol-
icy-makers a warning that labour subsidies
may be more relevant than capital ones for a
successful regional policy in the future (Tat-
sos, 1990). This suggestion should not hold if
an industrial policy with emphasis on capital-
intensive or high-tech sectors is adopted.
4. Conclusions
Entry in manufacturing industry is a determi-
nant of its structure and performance. It also
affects regional development in the sense
that new, healthy ® rms promote industr ial
growth, employment and income-making re-
gions independent of the centre’ s `protection’
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and capable of sustaining a decent standard
of living.
By examining the different factors which
are thought to affect the entry decision, it
was found that entrant ® rms in Athens had a
more hesitant approach to factors related to
pro ® tability and increased competition . On
the other hand, entrant ® rms in the rest of the
country showed strong interest in expected
pro ® tability , preference to safe markets and
indifference to threats posed by international
competition. Both are negatively affected by
the relative cost of labour, with the periphery
showing a much stronger response. At the
same time, both are not affected by capital
requirements. The two results could suggest
that labour subsidies instead of capital ones
may be more relevant for regional develop-
ment.
No prospects of changes in the Greek in-
dustrial structure are evident in either loca-
tion, which is a negative sign for its
evolution . Even so, it seems to be the case
that entry in the periphery not only is larger
but it also responds to healthier criteria
showing an increasing dynamism. It remains
to be seen in the near future if regional
development will be enhanced by such pref-
erences. The signs given by the present
analysis are rather positive.
Notes
1. New ® rm creation will enhance regiona l de-
velopment only if it create s links with the
speci ® c region where it locatesÐ e.g. em-
ploys local labour force , uses local product s,
consumers or invests its pro ® ts in the region .
Otherwise entry may be neutra l or even
negative , as one referee suggested, for re-
giona l development and prosperi ty. A quick
look at Greek industri al employment data
shows that in the 1978±88 period industri al
employment increase d by 17.9 per cent in
the rest of Greece , while it decreased by 12.4
per cent in Athens (NSSG). This may be a
sign of positive entry effects on regiona l
employment and income.
2. The period covered is 4 years and the infor-
mation on new establishments is disaggre-
gated in 20 2-digit sectors . Thus 80
observa tions should be availabl e. Sector 22,
tobacco , had no entries in any of the years
and it is conside red as a specia l case of a
heavily oligopol istic market facing decreas -
ing demand. Therefore we decided not to
include it in our sample; 76 observa tions
remained.
3. The only data on capita l disaggregated at
2-digi t manufacturing secto r level are col-
lected by the CGI. The source is the balance
sheets of corporat ions where capita l appears
at historic , i.e. acquisit ion, cost. Since no
information is availabl e on the speci ® c year
of each acquisiti on, capita l canno t be
de¯ ated and therefor e it canno t be trans-
ferred into any comparable units and used in
econometric estimations .
4. It should be noticed that when the same
regression was run with aggrega te data refer-
ring only to large size entrie s national ly, the
concentr ation effect was negative . Appar-
ently large ® rms are taking into accoun t the
possibili ty of collusio n and predatory behav-
iour by incumbents, while medium-sized
® rms include d in our sample are satis ® ed to
belong to the fringe and follow the large
price-set ters’ policie s which may guarantee
enough pro ® ts for them. The annua l entry
ratio of large ® rms is 8 per cent, while the
entry ratio in our sample is 20 per cent.
Unfortuna tely , the large entry data are not
disaggregated regional ly.
5. It should be stresse d again that when the
same regression is run with aggrega te data
from large-si ze entries , the import penetra -
tion effect is negative while the export share
one is positive . One explana tion may be that
large ® rms avoid sectors that are heavily
penetrat ed by imports and therefor e probably
saturated and not able to absorb their large
producti on potentia l. For the opposite rea-
sons , they prefe r sectors with increased ex-
port potentia l. For the medium ® rms
include d in our sample, import penetrat ion
means apparen tly that the market is safer
demand-wise, while they do not try their
luck in exports being afraid of or incapabl e
of facing internat ional competition .
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